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decedent by gift during the one-year period ending on the
date of the decedent's death, and the property passes from
the decedent back to the donor of the property, the basis of
the property remains the adjusted basis in the hands of the
decedent immediately prior to death.15  Thus, a new basis is
denied to the property.
Although the ruling has been criticized, it dampens the
enthusiasm for joint living trusts for spouses.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 62.04 (1993); Harl
Agricultural Law Manual § 8.03 (1993).  See also Esperti and
Peterson, Joint Trusts Are Good Planning Tool for a Married
Couple, 20 Estate Planning 148 (1993); Adams, The Joint
Trust: Are You Saving Anything Other Than Paper?  131
Trusts & Estates 39 (Aug. 1992).
2 Rev. Rul. 66-283, 1966-2 C.B. 297.
3 I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
4 See I.R.C. § 1014(a).
5 Id.
6 I.R.C. § 2056.
7 I.R.C. § 2041.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9308002, Nov. 16, 1992.
9 Id.
10 I.R.C. § 2041.
11 Ltr. Rul. 9308002, Nov. 16, 1992.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 I.R.C. § 1014(d).
15 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[4].* The debtor
had received a life estate in a farm by testamentary bequest
from the debtor's parent. The debtor mortgaged the farm
and after defaulting on the secured loan, entered into a
settlement with the lender for $80,000 which was placed in
a spendthrift trust for the debtor. A bankruptcy creditor
challenged the trust as fraudulent because a settlor cannot
be a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. The debtor argued
that the trust was established by either the lender or the
court and was valid. The court held that the trust was
established by the debtor as part of the default settlement
and included the trust property in the bankruptcy estate. In
re Morris, 151 B.R. 900 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 144 B.R.
401 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[4]
ANNUITY. The debtor owned several annuities which
were claimed as exempt under Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e).
The court held that because the debtor had the right to
withdraw amounts from the annuities at any time, the
annuities were not eligible for the exemption. In re
Huebner, 986 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 141 B.R.
405 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor had granted three
mortgages against the debtor’s residence which in total
exceeded the fair market value of the residence. Prior to the
granting of the third mortgage, a creditor had perfected a
judgment lien against the residence, and the debtor sought
to avoid this lien as impairing the homestead exemption.
The court held that the lien could not be avoided because
the avoidance would elevate the third mortgage in priority,
an action not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, a
debtor can only avoid liens in reverse priority order and
later consensual liens will insulate prior avoidable liens
from avoidance. In re Thomson McKinnon, Inc., 151 B.R.
324 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. Less than three months
before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor transferred a
residence to the debtor and nondebtor spouse as tenants by
the entirety. The debtor claimed the residence as exempt.
After the period for objecting to exemptions had passed, the
trustee sought to avoid the pre-bankruptcy transfer of the
residence as a fraudulent conveyance. The debtor argued
that the objection was untimely because the successful
avoidance of the transfer would make the residence
ineligible for the exemption and the period for challenging
exemptions had expired. The court held that the limitation
period for objecting to exemptions did not govern the right
of the trustee to seek avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers.
In re Harry, 151 B.R. 735 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors were husband and wife and
each claimed a full $5,000 exemption for the homestead.
The trustee objected to the wife’s exemption, arguing that
the wife had no interest in the homestead because title to the
property was solely in the husband’s name. The court held
that the wife could claim an exemption up to the present
value of the wife’s dower interest in the homestead. In re
Miller, 151 B.R. 800 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
The debtor and nondebtor spouse owned a residence as
tenants by the entirety. Creditors with security interests in
the residence were granted relief from the automatic stay to
pursue foreclosure against the residence and the residence
was sold at auction. After payment of the claims against the
residence, $20,000 in equity remained for distribution. The
court held that the nondebtor spouse was entitled to one-half
of the remaining equity but that the debtor was entitled to
only the $5,000 state exemption, with the estate receiving
the remainder. In re Blair, 151 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1992).
The debtors were allowed a homestead exemption for
the proceeds of a residence owned and occupied on the date
of bankruptcy filing, although the debtors were in the
process of moving to another state and sold the residence 10
days after the filing.  In re Raymond, 987 F.2d 675 (10th
Cir. 1993), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 132 B.R. 53
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
    CHAPTER 12   
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The Chapter 12 debtor had
substantially completed all plan payments and had filed a
Final Report and Account in preparation for requesting a
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final discharge. Two creditors and the trustee objected to
the Final Report, arguing that all disposable income had not
been paid. The debtor’s counsel filed an interim fee
application for services rendered in litigating the disposable
income issue. The trustee and creditors objected to the fee
application, arguing that attorney’s fees should be paid by
the debtor individually and not from the estate after the
filing of the Final Report because such services only benefit
the debtor in seeking a discharge. The court rejected the
trustee’s “bright line” test and held that the fees would be
allowed because the issue of disposable income is part of
the administration of the estate and compensable from the
estate. In re Gage, 151 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1993).
CLAIMS-ALM § 13.03[8]. A creditor had a security
interest in several pieces of farm equipment owned by the
Chapter 12 debtor. The creditor filed a claim in the case and
classified the claim only as secured. The debtor transferred
all of the collateral to the creditor and in the Chapter 12
plan listed the claim as completely satisfied. The collateral
had not been sold as of the date of the creditor’s objection
to the plan. The court held that because the creditor had not
filed any claim for any unsecured portion of its claim nor
filed for a valuation determination of the collateral securing
its claim, the creditor was estopped from objecting to the
Chapter 12 plan for failure to provide for any unsecured
portion of the claim if the sale of the collateral did not
produce sufficient proceeds to pay the entire secured claim.
In re Harrison, 987 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1993).
ELIGIBILITY-ALM § 13.03[8][a].  A creditor
objected to the debtor family farm corporation’s eligibility
to file for Chapter 12 bankruptcy because the debtor had
less than 50 percent of its income from farming and the
debtor had more than $1.5 million in debts. The debtor had
reached a post-petition agreement with one creditor to
reduce the claim and some related creditors’ claims had not
been listed by the debtor. The court held that a family farm
corporation did not need to meet the 50 percent farm
income requirement for individuals.  The court also held
that the date for determining the amount of aggregate debts
was the date of the petition, without consideration for later
reductions; therefore, the debtor was not eligible for
Chapter 12 because the amount of claims on the petition
date exceeded $1.5 million. In re Cross Timbers Ranch,
Inc., 151 B.R. 923 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8][c]. The FmHA held a security
interest in the debtor’s farm land. The debtor’s Chapter 12
plan proposed to pay the FmHA over 31 years the fair
market value of the land less 10 percent for the cost of a
hypothetical sale. The debtor intended to retain the land and
use the income from farming the land to fund the plan. The
court held that where the debtor retained the collateral, the
value of a secured creditor’s claim could not be reduced by
the costs of a hypothetical sale; thus, the plan must provide
for payment of at least the fair market value of the collateral
land. In re Good, 151 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor’s Chapter 11 plan
provided for payment of a Commodity Credit Corporation
loan over the period of the plan but the CCC offset several
disaster and deficiency payments against the loan. The
Chapter 11 plan contained express language that the
automatic stay was to remain in effect for the duration of
the plan. The debtor argued that the setoffs violated the
automatic stay and sought recovery of the offset amounts.
The CCC pleaded the defense of governmental immunity
against suits for monetary awards. The court held that
governmental immunity was not waived under Section
106(a) or (b) because the confirmation of the debtor’s plan
dissolved the bankruptcy estate; therefore, no claim
remained as to estate property because no estate existed.
The court also held that under United States v. Nordic
Village, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992), governmental immunity was
not waived under Section 106(c) for actions for monetary
damages. In re Johnston, 151 B.R. 367 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS-ALM § 13.03[4]. Almost
a year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the debtor’s
father died and bequeathed to the debtor a one-half interest
in real property. Two months before filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor disclaimed the interest in the property such that
the property was considered, under state probate law, to
have passed directly to the debtor’s children. The
bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the transfer under
Section 548 because the debtor was insolvent at the time of
the disclaimer and received no consideration for the
disclaimer. The court noted that In re Atchinson, 925 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1991) held that a disclaimer was not a
“transfer” because the disclaimer erased the disclaimant’s
interest in the property. The court declined to follow
Atchinson because although the disclaimer removed the
debtor’s interest in the bequest, the disclaimer itself
remained a positive act effecting a “parting with property or
an interest in property” by the debtor.  Therefore, the
disclaimer was an avoidable transfer. In re Brajkovic, 151
B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
CLAIMS. The IRS had not received any notice of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case and as a consequence, failed to
file a claim until more than one year after the claims bar
date.  The claim was for priority taxes assessed for tax years
for which the debtor failed to file a return. The IRS argued
that it was still entitled to a priority distribution under
Section 726 because it had not received notice of the case.
The court held that the IRS was entitled only to a second
priority under Section 726(a)(2)(C) which specifically
governed claims filed late because of lack of notice. In re
Mantz, 151 B.R. 928 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6]. The issue in this case
was whether the debtors’ tax liability for 1986 was
nondischargeable because the return for those taxes was due
within three years of the filing of the petition. The
Bankruptcy Court had made a factual determination that the
debtors had filed for an automatic four month extension
which placed the last due date for the 1986 return within the
three years before the filing of the petition. The District
Court upheld that determination; therefore, the taxes were
nondischargeable.  In re Gidley, 151 B.R. 952 (M.D. Fla.
1992).
The debtor had obtained an extension to file for 1988
taxes until August 1989, within three years before the
bankruptcy petition, and had actually filed the return within
two years before the bankruptcy petition. The court held
that the taxes were nondischargeable under Section
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523(a)(1)(A). In re Courtney, 151 B.R. 964 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
B A I L M E N T . The plaintiffs contracted with the
defendant to use the defendant’s harvested corn field for
pasture for the plaintiffs’ cattle. Under the agreement, the
plaintiffs could remove the cattle at any time and remained
responsible for any sick cattle and for maintaining the
fences. During a winter snow storm, the plaintiffs requested
the defendant to provide hay until the cattle could be
removed. When the cattle were taken, the plaintiffs
discovered 16 missing. Seven steers were later found and
appeared to have been stolen. The plaintiffs sued the
defendants for the lost cattle, arguing that the defendants
were bailees or at least negligent in caring for the cattle.
The court held that the contract was a pasture lease because
the plaintiffs never relinquished control over the cattle as
evidenced by the plaintiffs’ right to remove the cattle and
responsibility for the fences. Taghon v. Kuhn, 497 N.W.2d
403 (N.D. 1993).
CONTRACT. The plaintiff and defendant were partners
in a partnership which owned a stallion. Under the
partnership agreement, the partnership could be terminated
by either party by requesting the sale of the stallion and
both parties had the right to purchase the other’s share. The
defendant orally agreed to purchase the plaintiff’s share of
the horse and the defendant sent a letter memoralizing the
oral contract. The defendant failed to make the purchase
and the horse was sold at auction with the proceeds to be
divided by the court. The court held that a contract existed
and that the defendant would be liable for damages proved
by the plaintiff. Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427
S.E.2d 363 (Va. 1993).
TIMBER. The plaintiffs entered into a 60 year timber
cutting contract which allowed the defendants to purchase
and remove the annual average pine growth of a tract of
timber. The contract provided that if the defendant failed to
remove the full amount each year, that backlog amount
could be cut later, including after termination of the
contract. The defendant also had a right to remove an
unlimited amount of hardwood but was not required to pay
for that until after harvest. The defendant exercised a right
to terminate the contract early and after the termination
filled its backlog with harvested hardwood. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had overharvested the pine trees
and violated the contract by filling the backlog with
hardwoods. The plaintiffs argued that the contract required
the defendant to leave the tract with the capability of
producing a minimum amount of annual average growth.
The court held that because the contract limited the annual
amount of harvest to the annual average growth of 1479
cords, the defendant was required to manage the cutting so
as to leave the tract with at least that amount of annual
average growth.  The court also held that because the
backlog was defined in the contract to include the amount
of timber paid for but not cut, the backlog could not be
filled with hardwoods which were to be paid for after
harvest. Steward v. Champion Intern. Corp., 987 F.2d
732 (11th Cir. 1993).
CORPORATIONS
STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTION. The articles of
incorporation of a family farm corporation prohibited the
transfer of a shareholder’s interest in the corporation
without first offering the shares to the other shareholders or
to the corporation. One shareholder pledged stock in
security for a loan from the defendant. After the
shareholder’s default on the loan, the corporation sought to
invalidate the stock pledge as violating the articles of
incorporation. The defendant had sought information from
the corporation as to how the defendant could comply with
the transfer restriction in order to have the stock sold. The
court held that the prohibition on transfer of the stock did
not include the pledging of the stock. The court noted that
the defendant was not seeking ownership of the stock but
only the liquidation of the stock under the restriction so as
to recover the value of the stock. Lahaye Bros. v.
American Security Bank, 614 So.2d 1381 (La. Ct. App.
1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS.-ALM § 11.01[2][g].* The
plaintiffs were farmers who had conveyed their land to the
FmHA in satisfaction of loans. The conveyances were made
under demand from the FmHA without notice to the
plaintiffs of their rights to loan restructuring as required by
an injunction issued in Colman v. Block, 100 F.R.D. 705 (D.
N.D. 1983.  The plaintiffs argued that the failure to give
notice violated the injunction and sought recovery of their
property and FmHA compliance with the applicable statutes
and regulations. The court held that the contempt statute, 18
U.S.C. § 401, contained no waiver of sovereign immunity
by the government for contempt actions against it.  In
addition, the court held that the plaintiffs’ action was in the
nature of a tort action, required to be filed according to the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184
(8th Cir. 1993).
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued an interim rule
to add New Jersey to the list of validated brucellosis-free
states. 58 Fed. Reg. 28342 (May 13, 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04. The plaintiff
purchased federal crop insurance from the defendant who
issued the insurance under a reinsurance agreement with the
FCIC. When the defendant refused to reimburse the plaintiff
for losses to a rice crop, the plaintiff brought an action in a
state court for breach of contract, negligence, violations of
the state insurance code, conspiracy and breach of the duty
of good faith  dealing. The defendant removed the case to
federal court alleging that the case involved federal law and
that the state action was preempted by the federal law and
regulations. The court held that the state actions were
preempted by the federal crop insurance law and regulations
which extended to agencies reinsured by the FCIC. Brown
v. Crop Hail Management, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.
Tex. 1993).
PEANUTS.  The plaintiff entered into a sale agreement
under which the plaintiff “sold” a peanut allotment to the
defendant for four years in exchange for four annual
payments and the resale of the allotment back to the
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plaintiff for one dollar. The defendant made the payments
and returned the allotment after four years but retained the
increase in the allotment during the four years. The plaintiff
sued for return of the increase. The defendant argued that
the agreement was void as a lease for more than one year,
which was illegal under USDA regulations governing
transfer of peanut allotments. The court held that the
transaction was a four year lease because the defendant did
not receive all attributes of title where the defendant could
not further sell the allotment other than to the plaintiff.  The
court also held that the lease was not illegal because the
federal regulations only stated that leases of more than one
year would not be approved but the county committee failed
to object to the transaction. The court remanded the
summary judgment for the defendant on the issue of
whether the agreement required return of the entire
allotment or only the amount of the allotment originally
transferred. Franklin v. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2]. The plaintiffs sold produce to the
defendant and were not paid for part of the shipments. The
first plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant
corporation as well as the sole shareholder and officer for
failure to maintain sufficient funds in the PACA trust to
make payment. The defendant argued that he could not be
held individually responsible for the PACA trust because
the defendant individually was not a licensed produce
purchaser. The court held that although the corporate
licensee was primarily responsible for the PACA trust, the
individual defendant held a fiduciary position in the
corporation and was secondarily liable for the PACA trust.
The second plaintiff also sued under the PACA trust but the
defendant argued that the payment terms exceeded the
PACA trust requirements. The court held that the terms “net
30” were placed in writing and were intended to mean
payment within 30 days of purchase and not 30 days after
invoice; therefore, the payment terms did not violate the
PACA trust requirements. Morris Okun, Inc. v. Harry
Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
The plaintiffs sold produce to the defendant who failed
to pay for it. The plaintiffs preserved their rights to the
PACA trust and sought inclusion of the defendant’s real
property as part of the trust fund. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant had used some of the proceeds from the sale
of the produce to make payments on loans used to purchase
the property. The court held that because the defendants
failed to provide evidence of the use of the proceeds to
rebut the plaintiffs’ allegations, the real estate was included
in the PACA trust fund. Tony Vitrano Co. v. National
Produce Co., Inc., 815 F. Supp. 23 (D. D.C. 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04 The plaintiff sought
recovery under the Texas products liability law for injury
suffered from exposure to 2,4-D, a federally registered
pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff
alleged that the labels on the containers were insufficient
warning. The court held that the state court action for
negligent failure to warn was not preempted by FIFRA.
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D.
Tex. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6]. In December 1988, a grandparent established
seven trusts, one for each of seven grandchildren, with
corpus of less than $2 million each. The trusts were
identical and provided that each beneficiary had a general
power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. One of
the grandchildren died and the will appointed the trust
corpus to six trusts, one for each of the remaining
grandchildren. The trusts were identical to the the original
trusts and the trustee decided to transfer the corpus of each
of the second set of trusts to the first set of trusts. The IRS
ruled that the transfer would not subject the original trusts
to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9316023, Jan. 22, 1993.
The taxpayer established trusts for grandchildren with
the taxpayer’s spouse as trustee. The taxpayer did not have
the right to name a successor trustee and the beneficiaries
had the annual power to withdraw the lesser of the amounts
contributed to the trusts by the taxpayer or $5,000. The
taxpayer had made annual contributions after 1985. The IRS
ruled that (1) the trusts were subject to GSTT to the extent
of the post-September 25, 1985 contributions and (2) post-
1985 distributions of income and principal were subject to
GSTT as well as a portion of corpus when the trusts
terminate. Ltr. Rul. 9316025, Jan. 23, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].  The
decedent created an intervivos trust of which the surviving
spouse was the remainder beneficiary. The decedent’s
daughter was the second remainder beneficiary with the
trust corpus passing eventually to the decedent’s
grandchildren. The trustee elected to split the trust so as to
elect QTIP treatment as to a fraction of the trust so as to
reduce the estate tax as much as possible. The same fraction
of all trust assets was to be placed in the QTIP trust. The
QTIP trust would also be split into two portions with one
portion receiving a reverse QTIP election and both portions
receiving a portion of the decedent’s GSTT exemption
amount such that the inclusion ratio for both portions would
be zero. The IRS ruled that the QTIP trust would be eligible
for the marital deduction. The IRS also ruled that the split
of the QTIP trust would be effective for GSTT purposes so
long as the same portion of each asset is divided between
the trusts and the split occurs before the due date for the
federal estate tax return. Ltr. Rul. 9317007, Jan. 15, 1993.
The taxpayer owned an IRA and created a trust as
beneficiary of the IRA with the taxpayer as trust
beneficiary. The trust became irrevocable upon the death of
the taxpayer or when the taxpayer reached age 70 1/2. The
taxpayer retained the right to change the IRA beneficiary
and to require distribution of trust corpus. The taxpayer’s
spouse was the remainder beneficiary and the trust was
required to distribute at least semi-annually, at least as
much trust property as was equal to the income from the
IRA property. The IRS ruled that the transfer of the IRA to
the trust was not subject to federal gift tax because the gift
was incomplete. The IRS also ruled that the trust would
qualify for the marital deduction as QTIP. Ltr. Rul.
9317025, Jan. 29, 1993.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
    ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.* The taxpayer
parent corporation had submitted 15 Form 3115’s for a
change in accounting method for its 15 subsidiaries
pursuant to Rev. Proc. 84-74, 1984-2 C.B. 736 and Notice
88-78, 1988-2 C.B. 394. On the forms, the taxpayer had
indicated that it had not been contacted in any manner by
the IRS for an examination of income tax returns. However,
the taxpayer had received a phone call from an IRS agent
stating that the consolidated return of the parent and
subsidiaries had been selected for examination. The IRS
ruled that the phone call was sufficient contact to preclude
the taxpayer’s and subsidiaries’ use of the methods
provided in Rev. Proc. 84-74 and Notice 88-78. Ltr. Rul.
9316002, Dec. 22, 1992.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayers
had 1989 net operating losses which they carried back to
1986. Some of the net operating losses were preference
items in 1989 but not in 1986. The IRS ruled that for
purposes of determining the 1986 AMT, the taxpayers first
had to determine the alternate tax net operating loss
deduction for 1989 and then could carry back that deduction
to 1986 for use as a deduction in determining 1986 AMT.
The IRS also ruled that the minimum tax credit was not
available to the taxpayers because the credit was available
only for taxable years after 1986. Ltr. Rul. 9317002, Jan.
21, 1993.
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7].  The
taxpayer was a 25 percent shareholder in a corporation to
which the shareholder made some loans. The taxpayer
asserted that the loans were made in order to enable the
corporation to become profitable. The court found that the
taxpayer received no salary from the corporation and
received a substantial salary from other employment. The
court held that any deduction for the corporation’s failure to
repay the loans was as a nonbusiness bad debt because the
loans were not made to protect the taxpayer’s job or
business but were made to protect the taxpayer’s 25 percent
interest in the corporation. Silberstein v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.
Tax  Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,242 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
HOME OFFICE EXPENSE. The taxpayers owned
several rental real estate properties and an accounting
business which they managed out of their home. The court
ruled that the deductions relating to the home office were
not allowed because the taxpayers failed to show that the
office space was used exclusively and regularly in their
businesses. The taxpayers were also not allowed deductions
for car and truck expenses because of a failure to adequately
record those expenditures. Hall v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-198.
NET OPERATING LOSSES . The taxpayers were
required to first carryback their net operating losses where
the taxpayers failed to substantially comply with the
requirements for electing to waive the carryback period
because the taxpayers failed to identify on Schedule C the
amount of net operating losses for which the election
applied and the tax years of the net operating losses for
which the election applied. Garland v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-190.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.
DEFINITION. The IRS will not issue letter rulings as to
whether a limited partnership lacks the corporate
characteristics of limited liability and continuity or life if
the partnership is (1) formed pursuant to a state limited
partnership act that the IRS has determined to correspond to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and (2) meets other
requirements of Rev. Proc. 92-88, I.R.B. 1992-42, 39. Rev.
Proc. 93-3A, I.R.B. 1993-18, 15.
The IRS has issued as final regulations providing that a
limited partnership lacks continuity of life if upon an event
of withdrawal of a general partner from the partnership, a
dissolution of the partnership may be avoided by at least a
majority interest of the remaining partners agreeing to
continue the partnership. 58 Fed. Reg. 28501 (May 14,
1993), amending Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(4), (b).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  The IRS assessed a
limited partner for additional taxes based on a disallowance
of partnership losses.  The assessment was made after the
statute of limitations had run on the partnership return but
before the statute of limitations on the partner’s return.  The
court held that the assessment was not barred by the statute
of limitations on the partnership return because the
partnership return was only informational. Charlton v.
Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,239 (9th Cir.
1993), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-285.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a partner in a
law firm and under the partnership agreement, the taxpayer
could not charge the partnership for travel or other expenses
without the consent of the other partners. Under the
established practice of the firm, the taxpayer could only
seek reimbursement for expenses which could be charged to
the clients, with the remaining costs borne by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer deducted these unreimbursed expenses on the
taxpayer’s personal tax return as business expenses. The
IRS ruled that to the extent the taxpayer could not seek
reimbursement for the travel expenses, the expenses were
deductible as business expenses. Ltr. Rul. 9316003, Dec.
23, 1992.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in April 1993
the weighted average is 7.95 percent with the permissible
range of 7.15 to 8.74 percent for purposes of determining
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
93-27, I.R.B. 1993-18, 13.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtor was an equal
shareholder, director and vice-president of a corporation
which bred, raised and marketed cattle for investors. The
debtor had the authority to write corporate checks but did
not do so unless directed by the other shareholder/president.
The debtor was responsible for the operation of the cattle
ranches and the other shareholder managed the company
accounts and sought investors.  The IRS argued that the
debtor’s position as director and vice president and the
debtor’s authority to sign corporate checks were sufficient
to make the debtor a “responsible person” liable for the
I.R.C. § 6672 100 percent penalty for the corporation’s
failure to pay federal employment taxes. The court held that
the debtor was not liable for the penalty because the debtor
did not have the actual responsibility for payment of the
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taxes. In re Taylor, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,245
(N.D. Okla. 1992).
The debtor was a 30 percent shareholder, director,
officer and production manager in a corporation which
failed to pay federal employment taxes. The debtor had
substantial control over the disbursement of corporate funds
and signed numerous checks. The court held that the debtor
was a responsible person liable for the penalty under I.R.C.
§ 6672 because the debtor had control over corporate
expenditures and authorized corporate expenditures while
knowing that the corporation owed the employment taxes.
In re Geise, 151 B.R. 432 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].
BAD DEBTS. An S corporation made a nonbusiness
loan in 1990. The loan became partially worthless in 1993
and that amount was written off the books in that year. The
remainder of the loan became worthless in 1994. The IRS
ruled that the corporation may only include the whole loan
as a short-term capital loss for 1994. Rev. Proc. 93-36,
I.R.B. 1993-19, 4.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. The taxpayer corporation
created a Stock Equivalency Plan for key employees. Under
the plan, the employees would receive units which
represented amounts to be paid upon the employee’s death,
disability or termination.  The Plan committee could also
make current distributions based on each employee’s
number of units. The units were not transferable and had no
voting right or right to corporate dividends. The IRS ruled
that the Plan did not create a second class of stock for
purposes of the S corporation election. Ltr. Rul. 9317021,
Jan. 21, 1993.
TRUSTS.  A decedent’s will created two trusts to which
S corporation stock passed. Each trust had one of the
decedent’s children as a beneficiary along with that child’s
children, with each beneficiary receiving a separate and
equal share in the trust. Each beneficiary’s interest
terminated upon the death of the beneficiary. The IRS ruled
that each beneficiary’s share of the trusts was a separate
trust eligible as a QSST if the proper election was made.
Ltr. Rul. 9317016, Jan. 26, 1993.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. Under I.R.C. § 162(a) as
amended by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992), traveling expenses (e.g.
meals and lodging) are not deductible if the taxpayer is
employed away from home for more than one year. The
new rule is effective for expenses incurred after December
31, 1992, even if the employment period began prior to that
date, but only for the expenses incurred after that date.
Notice 93-29, I.R.B. 1993-18, 14.
USER FEES FOR RULINGS. The IRS has issued
revised procedures for complying with the user fee
program, including a fee schedule for requesting
determination letters. A few of the fees are:
  Type of Ruling Request                                                                                         Fee (after 5/10/93)
Change in accounting period (Form 3115) $200
Change in accounting method (Form 3115) $600
All other rulings $3000*
Determination letters concerning income,
  estate, gift, excise, and employment tax
  and administrative provisions $250
* Reduced fee of $500 for individuals, estates and trusts with total
income of less than $150,000 per year and for "Subchapter F-
Exempt Organizations" with gross receipts of less than $150,000.
The fee is also reduced for identical rulings for (1) multiple
entities with a common member or sponsor, (2) multiple members
of a single entity, and (3) extensions to file Form 3115 on behalf of
more than one member of a consolidated group.
Rev. Proc. 93-23, I.R.B. 1993-19, 6.
PROPERTY
GAS TANK LEAK. The farm property involved had
been owned by one of the defendants. That defendant had
discovered that an underground gas tank was leaking and
stopped using the tank. The defendant did not inform
another defendant about the tank when the first defendant
sold the land to the second defendant. The second defendant
resold the land to the plaintiff “as is” with no warranties as
to the condition of the property. The plaintiff sued the real
estate broker for breach of warranty, misrepresentation and
deceptive advertising practice under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.
The plaintiff also sued the two previous owners for
misrepresentation. The trial court granted all defendants
summary judgment, holding that the “as is” clause protected
the broker and previous owner, neither of whom was aware
of the problem. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the broker had a duty of reasonable inspection to determine
material facts adverse to the transaction and the broker had
a duty under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 which also applied to sales
transactions. The court also reversed the summary judgment
granted to the previous owner because the plaintiff alleged
affirmative acts of misrepresentation and the “as is” clause
did not protect the owner or broker from affirmative acts of
misrepresentation. The court upheld the summary judgment
for the first owner because the first owner was not involved
in the sale to the plaintiffs. Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d
106 (Wis. App. 1992).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LANDLORD’S LIEN. In a case occurring under pre-
1992 law (i.e. before Louisiana adoption of the UCC), the
plaintiff leased farm land to the debtor to raise sweet
potatoes. After the lease was entered into, the debtor
granted the defendant a security interest in the crop and that
security interest was perfected by filing. The plaintiff
claimed a priority in the proceeds of the crop under La. Rev.
Stat. § 9:4521. The court held that the plaintiff’s landlord
lien was not entitled to the priority because the plaintiff had
not filed any notice of the lease as required by the statute.
Henry v. Pioneer Sweet Potato Co., Inc., 614 So.2d 853
(La. Ct. App. 1993).
PRIORITY. The defendants had granted a mortgage on
their farm to the plaintiff bank in July 1986. The defendants
had a money judgment rendered against them at that time
which was perfected in September 1986. On January 28,
1987, the defendant showed an officer of the bank a notice
of sheriff’s sale in which the judgment creditor was
attempting to levy on the defendant’s property to satisfy the
judgment. On January 30, 1987, the plaintiff bank lent the
defendant additional funds. The bank argued that the loan
was included in the mortgage and received the same priority
over the judgment lien. The court held that because the bank
had actual notice of the levy and the new loan was short-
term for additional funds, the new loan was not a
continuation of the mortgage and was junior to the
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495 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 5444
MADISON, WI 53705-5444
92
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The defendant had been hired to haul timber
which had been placed on a landing. The timber had been
cut from the plaintiff’s land without permission and had not
been branded with an owner’s mark. The plaintiff provided
no evidence that the defendant knew the timber had been
improperly cut or had participated with the cutters in
trespassing on the plaintiff’s land to obtain the timber. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant was liable for trespass
under Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.810, 105.815 or was liable as a
joint tortfeasor merely by hauling the timber. The court
held that the defendant was not liable under the statutes
because the statutory liability required that the defendant
enter upon the plaintiff’s land to haul the timber. The court
also held that the defendant was not liable as a joint
tortfeasor because no evidence was presented that the
defendant participated in or knew about the trespass of the
cutters. Bergman v. Holden, 848 P.2d 141 (Or. App.
1993).
ZONING
CENTURY FARM. The plaintiffs owned a farm which
was designated as a “century farm,” meaning that the farm
had been owned by the same family for over 100 years.
Under Iowa Code § 403.17(2), a century farm could not be
included in an “economic development area.” The plaintiff
brought suit against the city defendant after the city
included the plaintiff’s farm in an economic development
area. The city argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The court held that the statute was constitutional.
Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Network Systems Corp. v. U.S., 814 F. Supp. 778 (D.
Minn. 1993) (accumulated earnings tax) see p. 74  supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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